to have written a book. On top of that, several journalists and various commentators have produced their own volumes.
All of these works focus on the Simpson affair with little or no attention to other high-profile crimes. The homicide proceedings were widely described as "the trial of the century"; several OJ. books used that term somewhere in their title. 8 But the term was not original, something that was widely overlooked. Into this gap have stepped a criminologist (Gilbert Geis) and an academic lawyer (Leigh Bienen) to focus not only on Simpson but also on several earlier celebrated cases that transfixed Americans over the past seventy-five years: the Leopold-Loeb affair, the Scottsboro saga, the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann in the Lindbergh kidnapping, and the perjury prosecution of Alger Hiss. These cases "stood for something important,... offering a commentary on the condition of the time"; 9 they "will not be forgotten."'" As we shall see, other well-known criminal cases fit these criteria, but the authors' selections are certainly reasonable ones. Crimes of the Century provides a wealth of detail on the five celebrated cases under review, but it goes beyond simple description to raise important general questions about the operation of our criminal justice system. The book touches on almost every significant issue in the field," but the discussion is often frustratingly incomplete. Perhaps the problem reflects the authors' effort to make the book attractive to a wide audience, but the result might be too superficial for specialists and too sophisticated for general readers.
I.
Each case gets a chapter divided into four main sections: a factual overview, discussion of some larger issues presented by the case, a conclusion that ties the discussion to pervasive themes, and an essay describing materials for further reading. This last feature is especially helpful because all these cases have generated a substantial literature.
Geis and Bienen focus their factual discussion on the uncertainties that have produced so much debate about each case. Except for Leopold and Loeb (who admitted liability but sought to avoid execution), the defendants vigorously asserted their innocence; Alger Hiss went to his grave nearly half a century later insisting that he would ultimately be vindicated. The authors offer their own hypothesis about what might really have happened on the train in the Scottsboro case, 2 opine that there was reasonable doubt about Bruno Richard Hauptmann's guilt, 3 suggest that the last word on Hiss has not been heard' 14 and observe that O.J. Simpson poses no threat to anybody else even if he did commit the murders of which he was acquitted. 5 By discussing several cases instead of focusing on just one, Geis and Bienen are able to show some connections that might otherwise be overlooked. For example, Clarence Darrow kept Leopold and Loeb from the gallows, 6 then went on to play an important role in getting the NAACP involved in the Scottsboro and Fred E. Inbau, "Playing God": 5 to 4, 57J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PoLIcE Sc. 377 (1966) case. 17 Samuel Leibowitz, who represented the Scottsboro defendants,' 8 also served as a commentator on the radio broadcasts of the Hauptmann trial' 9 and after the conviction was upheld on appeal sought to get Hauptmann to confess to avoid the electric chair. 20 Elmer Gertz, who helped get Nathan Leopold paroled after more than thirty years in prison, also indirectly affected the last chapter of the Scottsboro case: the libel suit filed by the two complainants following a network television drama about that case foundered on the legal standards announced in a major Supreme Court decision in which Gertz was the protagonist.
'
The authors point out other parallels between some of these cases. It turns out that Nathan Leopold and Alger Hiss were enthusiastic bird watchers. Leopold published several ornithological papers, 22 and Hiss unwittingly lent credibility to the allegations against him with his excited description of seeing a rare type of warbler, an incident that Whittaker Chambers had emphasized in talking with congressional investigators. 23 Both of these cases also had overtones of homosexuality. There were strong physical resemblances between Richard Loeb and Hiss, 24 1 n and between Leopold and Chambers. Leopold and Loeb were suspected of having a sexual relationship,2 although the authors give both men "a totally clean sexual slate" during their incarceration. 6 Geis and Bienen do not delve into the details of the "Id. at 26. The authors express no opinion about the validity of these suspicions. 2Id. at 21. This point is significant because Loeb was killed in prison. A famous news story about his death began: "Richard Loeb, who... was a master of the English language, today ended his sentence with a proposition." Id.
Hiss-Chambers situation, saying that such an inquiry would take us into "totally uncharted territory." 27 Finally, Scottsboro and Simpson present similarities as well as contrasts. In both cases African-American males were accused of committing crimes against white women. Scottsboro involved allegations of interracial rape, the most inflammatory offense in the old segregated order; Simpson had been part of an interracial marriage. The cases presented substantial economic differences, however. The Scottsboro defendants were impoverished residents of a segregated community that had a strictly enforced color line, whereas Simpson was a wealthy celebrity who seemed to have transcended race but whose acquittal by a predominantly black jury revealed wide racial disparities in public opinion. 8 As fascinating as the factual accounts might be, the book contains a surprising number of obvious mistakes. The Supreme Court's decision in Northern Securities Co. v. United StatesP is reported as an 8-4 ruling (the actual vote was 5-4).3o George Wallace is said to have pardoned the last of the Scottsboro defendants in 1954, although he was not elected governor of Alabama until eight years later; the correct date is 1964, when (as the authors note) Wallace was preparing to run for President for the first time. 1 Furthermore, in discussing Richard Nixon's reflections on the Hiss case during Watergate, the authors refer to 'John Haldeman";3 2 they apparently confused two of Nixon's top aides, H.R. Haldeman andJohn Ehrlichman. 5 The mistakes are not purely typographical. In at least two places there are inaccurate calculations of time. Bruno Richard Hauptmann is said to have been executed "[f] our years less one Id. at 146. 186, 212. 193 U.S. 197 (1904) . 
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V month and two days" after the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby.ss The interval was actually four years plus one month and two days: the kidnapping took place on March 1, 1932, 35 the execution on April 3, 1936. Similarly, the bodies of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman are said to have been discovered "more than three hours after they had been slain."ss The killings occurred "[s]ometime during the hour after 10 o'clock [in] the evening 37 and the corpses were found "[a]t ten minutes after midnight the following morning,"0 8 an interval somewhat in excess of two hours. This is not simply a pedant's nitpickings 9 Problems like these raise questions about the care with which the entire book was put together. The discussion of the larger criminal justice issues is also characterized by an analogous combination of sophistication and superficiality.
II.
Geis and Bienen are not content to summarize these highprofile trials. They use the five cases to explore persistent questions about the contemporary criminal justice system. Each case illustrates some issues, and broader themes emerge when the cases are considered together.
For example, the Leopold-Loeb case suggests the inadequacy of any comprehensive explanation of crime. The shocking murder defies understanding in terms of any of the leading criminological theories: differential association, social bonding, self-control, frustration-aggression, low intelligence, labeling, ra-, GE Is & BrENEN, supra note 9, at 110 (emphasis added).
Id. at 92. Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
"Nor are these the only mistakes. The authors twice misidentify Nixon biographer Roger Morris. See id. at 163, 166. There is another curious omission in the Hiss discussion: Geis and Bienen remark that Chambers converted to Quakerism and that Priscilla Hiss (Alger's wife) was a birthright Friend, see id. at 132, 133, but note that Richard Nixon was also a Quaker only in their list of suggested readings, id. at 166.
Moreover, they repeatedly attribute some of the hostility against Hauptmann to public antipathy toward Hider, id. at 7, 104 n.4, 112, even though the trial was held in 1935, well before the emergence of widespread American concern over Nazi expansionism as a threat to world peace. Focusing on American suspicions of Hider as an important factor also seems questionable in light of Charles Lindbergh's subsequent expressions of sympathy for Hider and his outspoken isolationism as late as the fall of 1941, shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor. See id. at 120-21. [Vol. 89 tional choice, or critical Marxist. 40 Psychiatric and psychological theories fare little better. 4 1 The authors ultimately are drawn to literary analogies, looking to Dickens and Hemingway novels for insight into Leopold and Loeb's behavior.
Scottsboro underlines many of the dilemmas in the treatment of rape, although the authors concede that the case "is something of an aberration." 4 3 The Hauptmann trial raises troubling questions about the reliability of eyewitness identification, which was a significant element in the prosecution's case." The Hiss case presents issues about the relationship between congressional investigations and criminal trials,4 and the OJ. affair highlights aspects of police behavior. 6 These are surely important topics, but the authors merely present them as problems for discussion without offering serious arguments for any particular resolution. 47 Although reasonable persons might disagree about how to resolve these issues, the authors do not present the strongest grounds for favoring one approach over another. Many of the issues are dealt with in a paragraph or two, with contrasting viewpoints summarized in an "on the one hand, on the other hand" fashion. 48 Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon is a two-sentence suggestion that "some people" prefer the inquisitorial approach to criminal justice that is the norm in Europe to the American adversarial system. See id. at 199. For a suggestion that the two systems do not differ all that much in actual operation, see Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE LJ. 240 (1977) .
" Ironically, the sketchiness of the presentation of these general issues might mitigate another concern: that focusing on these five high profile cases could distort policy discussions because the cases are atypical. Cf Peter Siegelman &JohnJ. Donohue III, Studying the Icebergfrom its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOc'YREv. 1133 (1990) (finding differences between cases that result in published opinions and those that do not). The authors concede that the cases they address might give a misleading picture of the criminal justice system but maintain that such cases "disclose the tensions, the inadequacies, and the underlying elements" of the system. GEms & BIENEN, supra note 9, at 10-11. Moreover, highprofile cases are likely to influence public perception of the legal process even if they are not representative. See, e.g., Grant H. Morris, Placed in Purgatory: Conditional Release of Insanity Acquitees, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1061, 1062-63 & nn.12-13 (1997)(noting occasional references to specific cases, there are no direct citations to sources and no attribution for the many direct quotations in the book. Readers who are interested in exploring the issues in greater depth presumably can rely on the list of suggested readings at the end of each chapter, but that will not always work because some important topics-including rape and eyewitness identification-are not covered in the reading lists. 49 Some pervasive themes arise in many of these cases, but again the analysis could be more profound. For example, the authors emphasize that economic resources affected the quality of legal representation available in several of these cases. -Leopold and Loeb came from wealthy families who retained Clarence Darrow as defense counsel, 51 and O.J. Simpson was rich enough to have a large team of prominent lawyers. 52 On the other hand, the Scottsboro defendants were impoverished and could not afford counsel in the first round of trials; 3 the lack of meaningful legal assistance led the Supreme Court to set aside those convictions. 4 Thereafter, however, the defendants' Authorial modesty might explain the omission of references to the rape literature, but the absence of citations to discussions of eyewitness identification is more curious. The Supreme Court has expressed concern about the reliability of unduly suggestive identification procedures. See, e.g supporters were able to bring in a most able lawyer, Samuel Leibowitz, whose efforts had mixed results: none of the subsequent trials resulted in acquittals, but charges were dropped against some of the defendants" 5 Alger Hiss was not wealthy, although his lawyers were from fancy law firms and some of them handled the case on a pro bono basis.5 The most troublesome situation was Hauptmann's, and here the authors are not as illuminating as they might have been. They note that Hauptmann could not afford to hire a lawyer and that the man who headed his legal defense was paid by the Hearst newspapers in a dubious arrangement that would not be allowed today. 5 7 Moreover, they note that the lawyer hardly talked to Hauptmann before trial and was "often drunk." 58 Despite the lawyer's "inadequacy," 9 the authors never mention-let alone explain-the concept of ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if Hauptmann could not have asserted such a claim under the legal standards of the time, 6 0 the issue is surely worthy of at least passing reference in a work that emphasizes the quality of lawyering in high-profile cases. In addition, the availability of competent attorneys is surely an important issue in contemporary criminal justice, and promoting increased understanding of the criminal justice system is one of the major •61 reasons the authors wrote this book•.
Another pervasive theme is the role of experts, who testified in all of these cases. Psychiatric testimony has been particularly controversial, but the authors show that such testimony appar- REV. 425, 455-60 (1996) . 6, The authors do not always alert readers to changes in legal doctrine that might have affected these cases. For example, one of the Scottsboro defendants escaped from prison in 1948 and made his way to Michigan, whose governor refused to extradite him to Alabama. See GIs & BmNEN, supra note 9, at 71. The matter ended there, but today a federal court could have compelled the governor of Michigan to comply with Alabama's extradition request . See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) . More generally, an asylum state now may not ordinarily refuse to extradite a fugitive upon procedurally proper demand from a requesting state. See, e.g ently had little effect on the Leopold-Loeb case 2 and, if anything, boomeranged in the second Hiss trial when the defense sought to show that Chambers, the government's star witness, was mentally unstable. 6 3 Geis and Bienen note that even one of O.J. Simpson's lawyers found the expert testimony in the criminal trial "incomprehensible to me-and I have been teaching law and science for a quarter of a century." 64 They are particularly skeptical of the handwriting testimony in the Hauptmann trial, so much so that they attack the credibility of the fatherand-son team of experts, in part because one of their descendants, who had followed in their footsteps, many years later was taken in by Clifford Irving's forgery of letters supposedly written by the notorious recluse Howard Hughes.6 Perhaps handwriting evidence should not be admissible,6 but invoking the mistakes of the third generation to attack the first and second is hardly a persuasive reason to support that conclusion.
The discussion of experts seems intended to get the reader to consider the wisdom of allowing the parties to control the presentation of technical evidence. Unfortunately, the authors never explicitly say so. The closest they come to making this point is in a brief reference to Wigmore's preference for courtappointed experts, and even then they simply remark that "this issue remains unresolved." 67 They do not observe that current law provides for courts to select experts,r* although the practice is still uncommon.r 9 Issues relating to the jury system also played a prominent role in these cases. Darrow deliberately sought a bench trial for Leopold and Loeb because he thought jurors would be hostile to his clients, 0 but there were jury trials in all the other cases. 
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Geis and Bienen concentrate their discussion of juries on Scottsboro and Simpson. They correctly explain that the Supreme Court's second Scottsboro ruling set aside the convictions because African-Americans had been excluded from the jury pool. 7 ' However, the authors imply that this ruling had more impact than it actually did: they cite the segregationist governor's call for compliance with the ruling but fail to note that three decades later the Supreme Court found continuing racial exclusion from Alabama juries. 2 The jury discussion in connection with the OJ. case consists of a paragraph apiece on peremptory challenges, the role of the judge in voir dire, juror pay, and jury sequestration, and two paragraphs each on juror questioning of witnesses and jury unanimity. 73 Like the issues of rape, eyewitness identification, and police behavior, 74 these presentations are much too brief to allow a thoughtful reader to weigh the desirability of any particular approach to these problems.
The role of the media is yet another pervasive aspect of these high-profile cases. Newspapers and radio broadcasters descended into a "feeding frenzy" from the outset of the Leopold-Loeb case,7 the Hauptmann trial was the first ever broadcast and attracted hundreds of reporters from around the world 76 the confrontation of Hiss and Chambers before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1948 was the first telecast of a congressional proceeding, and almost every aspect of the Simpson case (except the civil trial) was televised.
Against this background, it should come as no surprise that Geis and Bienen raise questions about media coverage. They devote most of their discussion of this topic to cameras in the courtroom, summarizing the views of proponents and critics 7' See id. at 66-67 (discussing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), and Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) ).
"2 See id. at 79. The later case is Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) . In fact, the 1935 decisions in Norris and Patterson were not exactly groundbreaking. As ChiefJustice Hughes pointed out in Non-is, the unconstitutionality of race-based exclusion of jurors had been clear for more than 50 years. The leading case is Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) . None of this is explained in the book. 73 See GFls & BIENEN, supra note 9, at 192-94. "4 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 7-Grls & BIENEN, supra note 9, at 25. 76 while concluding only that the future of televised trials seems "uncertain." 78 Among the suggestions they report is one of British journalist Alistair Cooke's, advanced in the wake of the Hiss-Chambers controversy, to prohibit the press from publishing leaks from closed congressional proceedings.7 Ironically, this idea is presented only four pages after the authors discuss, with apparent approval, Daniel Ellsberg's leaking of the Pentagon Papers. 80 Not only do they fail to remark on the apparent inconsistency between Cooke's suggestion and Ellsberg's action, they say nothing about the incompatibility between the idea and modem First Amendment jurisprudence.81 The authors also present another Cooke proposal, that the American press be prohibited from commenting on pending cases."' Whatever the merit of this idea, it is in obvious tension with the Supreme Court's hostility to restrictions on news coverage of trials. For example, the Court has made it extremely difficult to justify gag orders against the media even in sensational cases," has held that judicial proceedings are presumptively open to the public (including the press), 4 and has set a high standard for imposing sanctions against critics of the courts.8 Perhaps current First Amendment jurisprudence has struck the wrong balance in these situations, but the reader should at least be told that proposals such as Cooke's must be considered against the backdrop of existing law. 6 To the extent that these 78 Id. at 199. (1946) . 11 The authors do note that a California statute designed to limit payments to prospective witnesses during the pendency of legal proceedings, a measure adopted after some prospective witnesses in the Simpson case sold their stories to syndicated news programs and tabloid publications, was invalidated by a federal court. See GElS & BIENEN, supra note 9, at 197.
They further point out that only the Scottsboro case resulted in a Supreme Court ruling, which implicitly supports Justice Holmes's observation that great cases are not a vehicle for landmark legal rulings. On the other hand, perhaps this conclusion is a function of the cases Geis and Bienen selected for consideration.
There have been other "dramatic, wellpublicized, highly controversial trials that disclose the tensions, the inadequacies, and the underlying elements of criminal justice adjudication" 8 that remain the subject of impassioned debate to this day. Among them are those involving Leo Frank,9 Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, 1° Julius and Ethel Ro-
Itd. at 11. senberg, 01 and Sam Sheppard. 1 0 2 Three of those cases did result in Supreme Court rulings, at least two of them on issues that the authors address in this book. Frank, who was tried in a circus atmosphere and lynched after the governor commuted his death sentence, was the protagonist in a case that paved the way for more expansive federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. 0 3 Sheppard's first trial took place amid a torrent of prejudicial publicity, which led the Court to set aside his conviction.1 M
III.
In light of the criticisms of this book advanced above, two questions arise. First, why is a flawed work worthy of our attention? Second, what accounts for the flaws?
This book matters because the authors try to go beyond a simple chronicling of the facts and arguments of some high-profile cases. Geis and Bienen seek to use the cases as a vehicle for stimulating serious thought about our criminal justice system. One indication of their insistence on asking hard questions is their treatment of the exclusionary rule. Instead of focusing on the number of lost convictions that result from suppressing illegally obtained evidence-a question that has generated substantial controversyl 05 -these authors begin by explaining that the exclusionary rule leads police officers to lie about the circumstances in which warrantless searches and seizures take place. 1°6 Whether they have chosen the appropriate starting point is something about which reasonable persons might disagree, but the choice itself suggests that Geis and Bienen have some useful and provocative notions about criminal justice. We should be disappointed that this project, which had so much promise, ultimately fails to deliver. Perhaps, as Casey Stengel remarked in a very different context: "[I] t's a good idea, but sometimes it doesn't always work." 0 7
Maybe the problem is that Geis and Bienen have tried to address several audiences simultaneously. The dust jacket describes the book as a work in law, criminal justice, and true crime. This might explain the paucity of citations and the lack of footnotes, features that make this an atypical legal publication and could make it appear more accessible to a general audience, particularly to undergraduates. However, the lack of scholarly apparatus is not the problem. The real disappointment is that the authors did not try to challenge their readerswhoever they might be-with more detailed information about many of the issues that cry out for more thoughtful discussion than they have so far received.
103 Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 & n.6 (1984) (citing empirical studies and emphasizing the costs of the exclusionary rule), with id. at 942-43 & n.9, 950-51 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing many of the same studies and concluding that the exclusionary rule's costs have been exaggerated).
10' See GEmS & BIENEN, supra note 9, at 194-97. '0 Quoted in LEONARD Kopprr, ALLABOUT BASEBALL 116 (1974) .
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